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A JEWISH PERSPECTIVE ON
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
Hava Tirosh-Samuelson
In the last few decades, a new economic order has emerged world-
wide, dominated not by territorial nation-states but by transnational
corporations that are involved in global finance, industrial production,
product distribution, resource control, banking, insurance, health ser-
vices, and even education.1 The primary goal of the transnational cor-
poration is the maximization of profit and the main values that inform
the ethos of the global corporation are competition, specialization, and
efficiency. In the new global economy of free trade and free markets,
the transport of capital, materials, goods, and people takes precedence
over the autonomy, the sovereignty, and the culture of national gov-
ernments and local communities. Because economic globalization
entails the dissolution of tariffs and protective policies, the deregula-
tion of international commerce, and the treatment of foreign compa-
nies as if they were local entities, globalization spells delocalization.
The current economic globalization could not have taken place
without a corresponding technological revolution — in automation,
transportation, and communication. In the global economy, machines
have replaced human beings in virtually every sector and industry. As
corporations seek to maximize profit, millions of workers have been
temporarily (and, in some cases, permanently) eliminated from the
economic process, and whole work categories have largely or totally
disappeared, either due to automation or specialization. In part, the
global reach of corporations is facilitated by the increase in speed and
convenience of modes of transportation. But more important is the fact
that economic institutions and individuals worldwide are now linked
through satellites, telephones, cables, fax machines, and the Internet.
In a global digitalized environment, transactions are completed in
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nanoseconds and the lives of individuals or entire communities can be
transformed instantly by people who live thousands of miles away.
The impact of globalization has been far-reaching and complex. On
the one hand, globalization has improved the standard of living for
many segments of the world, especially in developing countries, due
to the export of scientific knowledge and technological expertise and
the mass production and distribution of material goods. New tech-
nologies of food production have improved agricultural yields, pro-
viding nutrition to a world whose population is continuing to grow at
an alarming rate, in part because of better health standards. Infant
mortality is down and life expectancy has gone up because of global
immunization programs, better sanitation and personal hygiene, and
improved water quality. Large segments of the human race now enjoy
better living conditions than they did half a century ago.
But on the other hand, in both developing and developed nations,
globalization has also resulted in impoverishment and dislocation
because transnational corporations do business where it is cheapest to
conduct. When local communities lose their sources of livelihood, peo-
ple are forced to relocate and, in some cases, masses of people are
forced to cross borders in search of jobs. Thus, in a booming global
commerce and unprecedented material abundance, the world of high-
tech and automated production witnesses temporary unemployment
and underemployment. In the midst of plenty, there is massive
retrenchment of workers and declining relative standards of living for
many people as the gap between rich and poor has increased.
The most dramatic aspect of globalization relevant to our discussion
is the emergence of a global monoculture. Through high-tech telecom-
munication, transnational corporations can now reach remote corners
of the world and dictate not only what, when, and where people will
produce whatever is needed for human life, but also how life is to be
lived. The corporate ideology, value system, priorities, and modes of
organization have dictated a commodity-intensive lifestyle in which
people define themselves by the ownership of products that are linked
through advertising to their own self-image and self-esteem. In the
homogenized global monoculture, entertainment conglomerates,
which transmit pictures, music, and verbal messages worldwide, have
gradually dismantled local cultures. All over the world, cultural
cloning takes place as people listen to the same music and watch the
same films or admire the same figures in pop culture. Local artists
have to fend against the massive penetration of transnational corpora-
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tions that has all but displaced traditional singing, accompanying,
chanting, and dancing. Many communities that were once economi-
cally, socially, and culturally self-sufficient have been thrown into cri-
sis.
In developing countries, where globalization means decolonization,
industrialization, and modernization, it has become increasingly diffi-
cult to perpetuate the traditional way of life. As modern telecommuni-
cation penetrates the remote countryside, imparting traditional
survival skills, customs, and ethical mores to children has been a real
challenge since children are surrounded by the education dispensed
through global entertainment networks. A growing gap between gen-
erations has opened, contributing to cultural and social revolutions in
developing countries.
In Western industrialized nations, the very notion that the past can
serve as a source of wisdom and guidance in the present is no longer
taken for granted. In a technology-driven society, the seemingly
unlimited possibilities of the future inspire the imagination much
more than the accumulated experience of the past. Moreover, in West-
ern countries, the very need to turn to the past has been called into
question due to a crisis of representation, fueled in part by the very
sophisticated technology of imaging. Under the radical skepticism of
so-called “postmodernism,” the validity of traditional mega-narratives
that once anchored collective memory and spelled out ways of life
have been seriously undermined. Even the notion of a stable Self,
which undergirded all knowledge claims, has been brought into ques-
tion. Indeed, how can the past be relevant or authoritative in a techno-
logically-based society in which new inventions and discoveries
instantly become obsolete, and scientific knowledge multiplies faster
than the human brain can absorb it? It is not surprising that, in the
developed world, personal identity is derived from the things people
own, which the transnational corporations are successfully selling to
consumers, convincing them that material goods are the sole source of
happiness and self-esteem. In short, in both developing and developed
countries, the very link to the past is now under siege by a global cul-
ture that glamorizes youth, bodily pleasures, and perpetual innova-
tion.
Much more can be said about the impact of globalization, especially
in regard to the planet’s physical environment, but I would like to
focus on one aspect of the “global moment” — homogenization of cul-
ture — from the perspective of the Jewish historical experience. I turn
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to history because I believe that knowledge of the past is necessary for
addressing the problems of the present and the challenges of the
future. Minimally, knowledge of the past is necessary so that we will
not make the same mistakes our predecessors have committed. But
more significantly, knowledge of the past sheds light on deep-seated
human proclivities, needs, and aspirations, thereby enabling us to
make more informed decisions in the present by considering what is
good for humans. I turn to the Jewish past not only because Judaism is
my tradition by birth, by religious choice, and by academic specializa-
tion, but also because the Jews have existed as a distinct ethnic and
religious minority as long as Western culture has existed. The history
of the Jews suggests that the problem of homogenization of culture is
not new; the Jews have had to face it throughout their historical exis-
tence. In their principled refusal to relinquish their own religio-ethnic
identity, the Jews serve as a testimony to the intrinsic merit of religious
pluralism.
The essay has three distinct sections. The first section examines
interreligious pluralism in Jewish history, namely, the relationship
between Jews and non-Jews, focusing on the pre-modern world. The
goal of this section is to explore ways in which a minority has dealt
with the challenge of homogenization, imposed on Jews from without,
which made the Jews the perpetual Other in Western culture. In the
second section, I discuss intra-religious diversity in modern Judaism,
exploring the various Jewish responses to the challenges of modernity.
Diversity from within has resulted in very acrimonious debates, forc-
ing Jews to learn to live with the Other Within. With a better under-
standing of the Jewish past, the third part of the essay provides
theoretical legitimation for religious pluralism within the matrix of
Jewish monotheism. Out of the historical reconstruction and the theo-
logical reflection, a three-fold argument emerges: (a) religious plural-
ism is necessary for human well-being; (b) religious pluralism requires
curtailment of political power; and (c) religious pluralism does not
necessarily result in relative subjectivism. Defending the merits of reli-
gious pluralism, I conclude with a critique of the contemporary West-
ern monoculture spread by transnational corporations.
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I. Jews and Others/Jews as the Other
A. Ancient Israel
Let me turn now to the interaction between Jews and non-Jews in the
past in order to get some specific data about interreligious pluralism.
The story of the Jews began about 1500 BCE, with the emergence of the
ancient Hebrews as a distinct ethnic group on the margin of Canaanite
civilization. While the Israelites shared with other peoples of the
ancient Near East certain aspects of material culture, economics, social
and political institutions, and legal practices, their collective identity
emerged through constant delineation of their own otherness. The col-
lective identity of the ancient Israelites was forged through oral narra-
tives about the remote origins of the group in Mesopotamia and their
determination not to mix with the indigenous population of Canaan.
The boundaries that separated Israel from its neighbors were both eth-
nic and religious. Membership in the people was understood not only
as a matter of birth and blood ties, but also in terms of a special rela-
tionship into which God, the creator of the world, had entered with
one people, His Chosen People, Israel.2 The relationship was and still is
understood as an everlasting covenant (berit) of mutual obligations:
God is obligated to ensure Israel’s safety and prosperity and, in turn,
Israel is obligated to do God’s will as revealed in a form of law, the
Torah. The covenantal paradigm frames Israel’s own self-understand-
ing and its interaction with other nations.
Israel’s self-perception as the Chosen People of God evolved over a
long period of time so that in the literary records of ancient Israelite
religion, the Hebrew Bible, one can find different views of the
covenantal paradigm. Some voices in the Bible view the covenant with
God exclusively, emphasizing the particularistic dimension of
covenantal relations, while others give the covenant an inclusive slant,
highlighting the universalist aspect of Jewish monotheism. In the
period of the Second Temple (538 BCE – 70 CE), the legacy of ancient
Israel, including the meaning of Chosenness, continued to evolve,
while Israel canonized its literary traditions as Scriptures and the Jews
in Judea debated the status, meaning, and scope of canonic teachings.
One of these interpretations — that of the Pharisees — emerged as the
dominant reading of the tradition, and it was articulated as normative
Judaism in the hands of a small scholarly elite, the rabbis. These schol-
ars of Jewish law emerged as the legal and spiritual leadership for the
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Jews, who were not only dispersed throughout the Near East but who
also lost the administrative and religious center of Jewish life when the
Second Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE.
The rabbinic interpretation of ancient Israelite religion would eventu-
ally be accepted as normative Judaism.3
The Judaism of the rabbis was grounded in the notion of a dual
Torah, articulated first by the Pharisees. According to this view, at
Sinai, God gave the nation of Israel through the prophet Moses not
only a Written Law, but also the Oral Law, which interprets it. The
legal, theological, and ethical teachings of the rabbis were developed
in relation to and on the basis of canonic scriptures but they presented
themselves as Oral Torah obligatory for all Jews. Since the rabbis them-
selves harbored a variety of perspectives that evolved over time (from
the first to the sixth centuries), it is quite difficult to generalize about
rabbinic Judaism. One can always find data to conflict with a given
reading. Nonetheless, I would venture to propose a certain reading of
the covenantal paradigm as it emerges from the teachings of the rab-
bis. The covenantal model explains why Jews have resisted, and con-
tinue to resist, any form of religious and cultural homogenization.
B. The Covenantal Paradigm: Particular Universality
First, the covenantal paradigm created a framework within which
Judaism interpreted the relationship between the Jewish people and
other nations. Indeed, the covenantal paradigm established a dialecti-
cal relationship between Israel’s well-being as experienced in history
and Israel’s commitment to God. When Israel is exclusively loyal to
God, the true ruler of the universe, and does God’s wish, Israel flour-
ishes and prospers. But when Israel forgets the special covenant with
God and adopts the ways of other “gods,” it incurs great suffering.4
For its betrayal, God justly punishes Israel by delivering it into the con-
trol of other nations, even to the point of exiling the Chosen People
from the land God gave as collateral of the special relationship. Thus,
the covenantal model provides the prism through which Israel inter-
prets its status in the world, including its relationship to other “gods.”
It is Jewish loyalty to the covenant that stands at the core of the Jewish
resistance to other religious worldviews.
Second, the covenantal paradigm established a close link between
the past and the future in Jewish self-understanding. Israel was not
chosen to be God’s people because it was better than other nations, but
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for reasons known to God only. Israel was elected to worship God
alone and expected to be devoted to God by observing God’s com-
mandments, the mitzvot, as articulated in God’s Torah (both Written
and Oral). To the extent that Israel has any merit, it is due to Israel’s
ancestors, the patriarchs and matriarchs, who were exceptional in their
belief in God. Israel, therefore, can never forget its ancestors and must
look to them as models of good conduct. To stand in a covenantal rela-
tionship with God entails learning from the past in order to flourish in
the present and be rewarded in the future. Precisely because God has
pledged an everlasting commitment to Israel, the people can never lose
hope in God. No matter how much Israel suffers in the present, the
hope for the better future can never be exhausted. Always learning
from the past in order to secure a better future, Israel continues to
assert its loyalty to God, despite evidence of its infidelity to the
covenant. It is the link between past, present, and future in Jewish self-
understanding that compels me to study the historical past of the Jew-
ish people in order to draw some lessons about our predicament in the
present and challenges for the future.
Third, if Israel is to be God’s people, it must conduct itself in a cer-
tain manner that facilitates the presence of God in its midst. To interact
with God within the parameters of the Covenant, Israel must become
holy: “You shall be to me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation”
(Exodus 19: 6). Holiness has both ritual and moral dimensions, which
historically can be traced to the interests of the priests and the
prophets, respectively. In rabbinic Judaism, the ritual and moral
dimensions are closely linked: God can be present in Israel only if
Israel properly observes a complex code of ritual purity (many of its
details can be understood against prevailing practices in the ancient
Near East) and if Israel, both individually and collectively, behaves
morally toward the poor, the widow, the orphan, and the resident
alien (ger) (Leviticus 19: 33–34).5 Through detailed commands, rabbinic
Judaism spelled out how one is to become holy through sanctification
of time, space, the body, human relations, and ritual performance. Out
of these detailed prescriptions for holiness, Halakhah (i.e., Jewish law,
broadly conceived) regulates all aspects of Jewish life, including the
relationship with non-Jews.
The Jewish doctrine of Chosenness illustrates the complexity of
interreligious pluralism in Judaism. The doctrine, especially in its rab-
binic elaboration, is a particularistic program with universal dimen-
sions. It is particularistic in its application: only the people chosen by
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God, for reasons known only to God, are obligated to observe very
specific things as ways to communicate with God, be they observance
of the Sabbath, strict dietary restrictions, or prayers. The 613 com-
mandments specified by rabbinic Judaism are obligatory for Jews only,
the recipients of God’s Torah; they do not pertain to non-Jews. The
Jews alone bear the consequences of observance or non-observance of
God’s prescriptions.
Yet this very particularistic program also includes universal aspects.
First, during the Hellenistic period, Judaism opened itself to non-Jews
through religious conversion open to all gentile peoples. The proselyte
(ger tzedek) had equal status with born Jews in terms of religious oblig-
ations and one was required to love him or her as one loves oneself.6
For the gentiles who do not convert to Judaism, rabbinic law carves out
a special category of legal obligations that purport to all human beings.
These are the seven Noachide laws that spell out the obligation to
refrain from negative conduct (such as murder, theft, and incest), as
well as the positive command to establish courts of law.7 These obliga-
tions are necessary for human society to exist and they function as nat-
ural laws do. Second, on the basis of biblical law, rabbinic Judaism
recognizes the category of the resident alien (ger) toward whom Israel
has special duties. Remembering Israel’s own initial status as alien in
Egypt, Israel is called to treat the resident aliens with compassion and
justice so as to protect their humanity. Third, rabbinic law recognizes
the intrinsic worth of all humans by virtue of being created “in the
divine image” and the command to “love your neighbor as you love
yourself” is extended not only to born Jews but to all human beings.8
Israel’s program for holiness thus includes the Other. Fourth, absorb-
ing the virtue ethics of Hellenistic culture, rabbinic Judaism spelled out
ethical ideals that enable those who aspire to them to be better human
beings. The rabbinic conception of moral perfection (shlemut) speaks in
the name of the human species at large, even though the path toward
human perfection is defined by the particulars of Jewish law. And
finally, in continuity with biblical prophets, rabbinic Judaism envi-
sioned a utopian future for humanity at large, and not just for Israel. In
the end of days, all nations will recognize the God of Israel as the one
and only God, while remaining ethnically distinct.9
The fusion of particularism and universalism in Judaism made it an
anomaly in the Greco-Roman world. Alongside hostility and ridicule,
the Jews provoked both fascination and admiration, attracting some
gentiles to adopt certain Jewish rituals without converting to
Macalester International Vol. 8
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Judaism.10 In the Hellenistic and Roman empires, Judaism stood out
because it was a national religion: the religious identity of the Jews was
inseparable from their ethnic identity. Unlike other nations that
absorbed the “gods” of the dominant civilization into their own pan-
theon of deities, Jewish monotheism precluded such syncretism. The
Jews stubbornly rejected the dominant civic religion of the Hellenistic
and Roman Empires and conducted their national politics as a service
to God. It is not surprising that the first recorded religious persecution
in history was directed against the national religion of the Jews. In 167
BCE, Antiochus IV correctly understood that to subdue the Jewish
nation in Judea and restore law and order to the Seleucid empire, he
must curtail the freedom to practice the laws of the Torah. Conversely,
the Jews interpreted their opposition to foreign presence on the Land
and in their Temple as a struggle between false “gods” and the one
and only true God to Whom their allegiance was due. When Jews
regained control of the Temple in 164 BCE, this was celebrated as God’s
victory and expressed through the ritual cleansing of the Temple in
Jerusalem.
The renewal of Jewish political sovereignty, however, did not entail
unity. During the short period of Jewish political independence in
Judea (140 BCE – 6 CE), the Jews fiercely debated what constitutes alle-
giance to the God of Israel. Both the role of the Temple in Jerusalem
and the meaning of God’s Torah were the subjects of heated controver-
sies, reflecting the social agendas of different groups as well as differ-
ent visions about the desired degree of interaction between Jews and
the dominant Hellenistic civilization and the attitude toward the
Roman rulers of Palestine. Interreligious pluralism was closely linked
to intra-religious pluralism. The internal tensions within the Jewish
community and the struggle between Judea and Rome finally reached
a crisis in the Great War of 66 – 70, which led to the demise of Jewish
sovereignty in Judea and the rise of one interpretation—Pharisaism—
to become normative Judaism.
C. Jews in the Middle Ages
With the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in 70 CE and the failure
of yet another revolt in 132 – 135, the dream of worshiping God in a
Jewish polity was postponed to the remote future of the Messianic
Age, when a king Messiah would reconstitute the Davidic monarchy.
That dream would be realized in the twentieth century when secular
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Jews, who rejected the traditional, passive waiting for the Messiah,
resettled in the Land of Israel and eventually founded the modern
state of Israel in 1948. Until the twentieth century, the Jews survived as
a distinct ethnic-national minority that enjoyed a large measure of
legal and cultural autonomy, first in the Roman and Byzantine empires
and later in Islam and Christendom.
In the diaspora, the Jews enjoyed extensive religious and legal
autonomy. They conducted their life according to their own religious
laws and managed most of their internal affairs on their own under the
leadership of rabbis who functioned as judges, administrators, teach-
ers, and spiritual leaders.11 By the third century CE, the rabbis conceded
the depoliticization of Judaism when they validated the dominant
legal system within the parameters of Jewish Law. Legal allegiance to a
foreign monarch no longer conflicted with religious allegiance to God
and His Torah, notwithstanding the persistent messianic dream about
the return to the Land of Israel and the rebuilding of the Davidic
monarchy. Coming to terms with their external political powerless-
ness, the Jews adapted themselves to life in exile under the domination
of foreign nations.
In the Middle Ages, the Jews found themselves living in the orbit of
two distinct civilizations—Islam and Christendom. In both cases, they
were recognized as a religio-ethnic minority that enjoyed protection of
life and property in return for special taxation and inferior social sta-
tus. But there was considerable difference between the attitudes of
Islam and Christianity to the Jewish minority. A later newcomer to
Near Eastern religions, Islam recognized both Judaism and Christian-
ity as genuinely divinely revealed traditions, albeit distorted ones, and
accorded to Jews and Christians the status of “protected people”
(dhimmi). Though the status entailed institutionalized discrimination,
it did create a legal place for Jews in Islamic societies and enabled Jews
to take part in almost all aspects of life, even including holding posi-
tions of power within the Islamic state. Moreover, in Islam’s self-
understanding, the Jews did not play an important role, even though
the early Medinan community under Muhammad emerged through
struggle with Jews of Medina. And Islam spread as a religion of a
small minority — the Arabs — who conquered vast territories. While
the new religion was the glue of the multi-ethnic empire, Islam did
compromise its own dream of uniting religion and politics when it
accorded special status to the “People of the Book.”
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Medieval Islam can serve as a positive example of interreligious
pluralism, in which a minority culture flourishes by adopting and
adapting the cultural modes of the majority. Absorbing both the Ara-
bic language and modes of Islamic culture, Jews reinterpreted rabbinic
Judaism which gave rise to new modes of self-expression. Jewish law,
biblical exegesis, poetry and prose, philosophy and the sciences, and
Jewish theology were all cast anew under the influence of Islamic cul-
ture, without losing their distinct Jewishness. Writing in Arabic or
Hebrew, Jewish authors continued to assert Jewish uniqueness and
even spiritual superiority, in literary style taken over from their sur-
rounding culture. The cultural symbiosis between Judaism and Islam,
especially from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, is an example that
cultural interaction need not erase collective identity and otherness.
Nonetheless, we must not romanticize the medieval past. In Islam, too,
Jews had to sustain periodic outbursts of hostility and forced conver-
sions to the dominant religion, and the long stretches of peaceful co-
existence were possible because of the hierarchical structure of Islamic
civilization in which Muslims and Islam enjoyed privileged status.
That hierarchical model for religious pluralism would be challenged
by the principles of liberal democracy in modernity.
The Jewish experience in Christendom provides a much darker per-
spective on interreligious interaction.12 In contrast to Islam, in Chris-
tendom the relations between Jews and non-Jews were necessarily
more antagonistic, because Christianity defined itself from the outset
as the “True Israel” which had supplanted Israel in the flesh. Since
Christianity was first a Jewish sect before it became a gentile Church,
Christian self-understanding was inseparably linked to Jews and
Judaism. The tragic relationship between the two religions was rooted
in the ambivalent status of the Jew in Christian self-understanding. On
the one hand, the Jews not only refused to acknowledge the Christian
claim about Jesus as the Savior, they were also directly accused of
killing the Son of God. In their stubborn infidelity, the Jews hindered
the universal spread of Christian Gospel and the culmination of its
sacred history in the Second Coming of Christ. But on the other hand,
Christianity (unlike Gnosticism) did acknowledge Israel in the flesh as
the recipient of the initial divine revelation and did consider the Bible
of the Jews as part of its own canon, albeit relegating it to the status of
Old Testament that had been superseded by the New Testament. The
Jews functioned as the “Witness People” of the Christian universal
message and had to be protected in order to validate the Christian
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message toward the pagan world. In theory, moreover, Jesus’ teaching
of love had to be extended to all people, including Jews, challenging
the Christian to love the very person whose continued existence
denied the universality of Christian claims. So long as the Jews existed,
Christianity remained unfulfilled. The two sibling religions were thus
entangled in a neurotic love-hate bond that left a trail of Jewish blood
in Western history.
Briefly, the Christianization of the West spelled the deterioration of
Jewish status. From being Roman citizens, who practiced a legal reli-
gion of great antiquity, Jews would be reduced in the next centuries to
the status of a permanent alien minority whose presence was both nec-
essary and irritating. In the late fourth century, St. Augustine articu-
lated the doctrine that Pope Gregory I translated into policy in the
sixth century: the Jews must not be molested and killed, but must be
kept in a subordinated status to Christians to remind them of their
eternal sins.
Utilitarian reasons, however, would make the presence of the Jews
in the midst of the Christian world economically beneficial. From the
tenth century onward, Jews played an important economic role in the
urbanization of Europe, concentrating in commerce and money lend-
ing. The latter activity, so odious to Christians, would breed deep
resentment and hostility toward the Jews, contributing to their demo-
nization in popular imagination. Legal protection was offered to Jews
by emperors and monarchs, who considered the Jews “serfs of the
Chamber.” Special taxes levied on Jews served as important sources of
funds to the royal treasuries, but the Jews could be legally dispensed
with whenever their presence was no longer deemed useful. Thus, in
the thirteenth century, as emperors fought with popes and monarchs
struggled with the aristocracy, the Jews were often used as pawns in
larger political struggles, leading to regional or total expulsions. The
status of the Jewish minority in Europe rapidly deteriorated: blood
libels, accusations that Jews desecrated the Host, staged spectacles in
which rabbinic literature was put on trial, economic exclusion and
exploitation, physical attacks, and regional or total expulsions of Jews
were all part of the tragic story of Jewish-Christian relations in the late
Middle Ages.
In the midst of this sad story of abuse, nonetheless, we should
remember that Jews enjoyed legal and cultural autonomy, and that
Jewish legal creativity reached unprecedented heights in Western
Europe during the 12th and 13th centuries. The very growth of Jewish
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legal thinking, especially biblical exegesis, was respectfully acknowl-
edged by some Christian biblical interpreters and theologians in the
twelfth century, leading them to adopt certain textual strategies articu-
lated by Jewish commentators. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
Jewish and Christian scholars would also collaborate in the translation
of ancient philosophical and scientific texts so that a schoolman, such
as Thomas Aquinas, consulted the views of Jewish philosophers, such
as Maimonides, while still advising kings to keep the Jews in a subor-
dinated status. Other Christian theologians, some recent converts from
Judaism, would use the growth of legal innovation to argue that the
Judaism of the thirteenth century was not a continuation of rabbinic
Judaism and that it should not be accorded protection. The attack on
the rabbinic tradition in the thirteenth century was led by recent Jew-
ish converts to Christianity who became formidable polemicists
against their previous brethren. From 1290 onward, a series of expul-
sions would bring an end to Jewish presence in Western Europe,
redrawing the map of Jewish diaspora. Jews moved eastward to new
territories in Eastern Europe and to the Ottoman Empire. In both
places, they enjoyed benign conditions that facilitated immense cul-
tural growth until the mid-seventeenth century. Some interesting
changes occurred during the transition from the Middle Ages to the
modern period (from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries), illus-
trating how porous the boundaries were between the two religions. In
Renaissance Italy, the revival of the classical heritage by the humanists
brought about genuine interest in the study of Hebrew and rabbinic
sources, privileging Kabbalah, the Jewish mystical tradition, which was
now declared to contain ancient theology that culminated in Christian-
ity. But neither humanism and its emphasis on the inherent dignity of
humanity nor the rise of Protestantism would ease Jewish-Christian
relations. On the one hand, the sixteenth century, beginning in Italy,
witnessed the ghettoization of the Jews and the erection of physical,
visible barriers between Jews and Christians that remained in place
until the French Revolution. The interaction between Jews and Chris-
tians was primarily functional, limited to specific business transac-
tions, and rarely involved socialization. But on the other hand, the
mass conversion of Jews in Iberia in the fifteenth century created a sit-
uation in which Judaism and Christianity became even more entan-
gled with each other. After centuries of pressuring Jews to convert, the
New Christians would be the object of distrust and suspicion, mani-
fested in the activities of the Inquisition whose goal was to weed out
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any form of continuing Judaization among the New Christians. Some
of them, indeed, continued to harbor allegiance to Judaism and even-
tually would find their way back to Judaism in Holland, England,
Italy, the Ottoman Empire, or the New World. The return of the New
Christians to Judaism would have an important impact on Jewish cul-
ture and religious self-understanding in the seventeenth century, man-
ifested, in particular, in their role during the messianic outburst in the
middle of the century. The Christians who reverted to Judaism were
also the basis for the establishment of new Jewish communities in
areas from which Jews had been previously expelled or never allowed
to settle. It was the French Revolution that compelled Europe to
rethink its attitude toward the Jews and grant them civil rights as citi-
zens. But the emancipation of the Jews would result in major intra-reli-
gious disputes about the meaning of Judaism.
In sum, the complex story of the Jewish past provides models (some
positive and some negative) from which to view the challenge of
homogenization. The historical experience of the Jews indicates the
complex nexus between religious pluralism and political power. The
history of the Jews compels us to wonder: Is religious pluralism the
result of political powerlessness or rather the moral obligation of the
politically strong? Is toleration of religions other than one’s own a con-
cession to defacto reality or a benevolent condescension that the victor
accords the vanquished? Suffice it to say that the data highlights the
importance of making the right choices. It is always up to humans to
determine how they will interact with other humans. What we do, in
other words, is much more important than what we say or think.
Whether to subdue, oppress, or eliminate the opposing Other or, con-
versely, to accept and make room for the Other as distinct from oneself
are all voluntary decisions that rational humans can undertake. Inter-
religious pluralism is predicated upon respect for the Other and the
willingness to acknowledge the rightful existence of the Other within
the boundaries of one’s own society, without expecting the Other to
play a role in one’s own self-understanding.
II. Intra-Religious Diversity in Modern Judaism
A. Jews Enter European Society
The relations between Jews and non-Jews changed considerably in the
modern period, but remained no less complex and ridden with ten-
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sions. In Judaism, there is a close link between intra-religious and
interreligious pluralism. How Jews should interact with non-Jews and
non-Jewish cultures has been a matter of debate from the very incep-
tion of Jewish history. If Jews are to be totally open to the culture of
their neighbors, radical acculturation could threaten the allegiance to
the Jewish collective lifestyle, values, beliefs, and practices. Whether
the process of acculturation is rapid and dramatic or slow and gradual,
the challenge for Jews is always the same: where does the boundary
between Judaism and other civilizations, societies, and cultures lie?
What are the limits of integration and acculturation and does one still
remain Jewish if these limits are crossed? Is membership in the Jewish
people a matter of practice or belief or some particular combination of
both? Which beliefs and which practices are necessary and sufficient
conditions for inclusion in the Jewish people? And what is the status of
a person born Jewish but who no longer feels connected to the Jewish
people in any significant way?
These questions became extremely acute during the modern period,
due to the secularization of the West and the rise of modern, liberal
democracy as the dominant political theory. In the modern period, the
very notion of Judaism as a religious ethnicity was no longer taken for
granted and a debate ensued whether Judaism was a “religion” or an
“ethnicity.” The debate emerged already in the late eighteenth century
and was inseparable from the process of Emancipation, namely, the
granting of formal civil rights to Jews in the country of residence. In
theory, the Emancipation entailed that Jews be recognized as equal cit-
izens whose inalienable rights are protected by law. The Emancipation
was to bring a formal end to centuries of discrimination, hostility, and
marginalization of Jews in Western society. In practice, however, the
Emancipation of Jews was a much more complex process, interwoven
with the modernization and secularization of Christian Europe.
To begin with, the Emancipation of the Jews was the logical conclu-
sion of the democratic principles of the French Revolution and the
assumptions of the Enlightenment which undergirded it.13 If, indeed,
all humans are by nature equal, and if Jews are humans, then Jews are
equal and all laws that discriminate against them must be removed.
The first part of the Emancipation process involved an intense debate
about the humanity of the Jews. Their presumably objectionable traits
were cited as a major reason why they could not become equal citizens
under the law. Logic prevailed over age-old animosity and the ghetto’s
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walls, which physically and socially separated Jews, came down when
the ideals of the French Revolution were exported throughout Europe
by the armies of Napoleon.
The logic of the Emancipation, however, stood in conflict with the
very nature of Judaism as a religious ethnicity.14 The Emancipation was
granted to Jews as individuals, endowed with rights—but Jews do not
exist merely as individuals and being Jewish is not merely a matter of
personal belief; rather, it involves a comprehensive way of life that can
be sustained only when Jews are connected to other Jews. Jewish cor-
porate existence, however, was incompatible with the modern nation-
state, as Napoleon was quick to understand, and had to disappear if
Jews were to become citizens of the modern, democratic nation-state.
The corporate status of the Jewish community had to be abolished
because Jews could not constitute “a state within a state.” The Emanci-
pation, then, denied the collective dimension of Judaism and com-
pelled Jews to see themselves as members of a religious denomination
whose faith was expressed in some specific ritual practices. By denying
the corporate structure of Judaism, the Emancipation tacitly expected
Jews to disappear as a distinct entity.
No less problematic was the fact that legal emancipation did not
entail a transformation of Europe’s emotional stance toward Jews.
Entrenched hatred and suspicion continued to exist, resulting in con-
tinued social exclusion and discrimination throughout the nineteenth
century and well into the twentieth century. Whether or not these neg-
ative attitudes are to be ascribed directly to Christian teachings is a
debate that need not concern us here. What is evident is that Jews
remained the hated Other long after they were formally granted civil
rights. Indeed, the more Jews were integrated into European society
during the second half of the nineteenth century, the more Europe had
to rationalize its traditional hatred. The legitimation came in the form
of pseudo-scientific racial theory that highlighted the Jewish Other on
biological grounds. Given the inherited difference between Jews and
other people, the Jewish presence in Europe became a “problem” to be
solved. The Nazis proposed the Final Solution to Jewish Otherness, and
the horrors of the Holocaust serve as an ominous reminder about what
humans are capable of doing to each other in the name of imposing
unity and sameness.
While the Emancipation indeed brought an end to Jewish formal
segregation, the meaning of being Jewish became much more complex.
In the modern nation-state, the Jewish community had lost its legal
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grip over its members. As Jews became citizens, association with other
Jews was a voluntary matter left to the discretion of the individual.
Moreover, the loss of Jewish autonomy meant that there was no recog-
nized Jewish authority to dictate to Jews how to behave or what to
think. It was up to each and every Jew to decide how to express a con-
tinued allegiance to Judaism and what value to accord the Jewish tra-
dition in one’s personal life. Plurality of opinions about the nature of
Judaism and the conduct that flows from it became the major charac-
teristic of modernity for Jews.
Ironically, while the Emancipation dissolved Jewish self-govern-
ment, allowing each Jew to decide how to be Jewish, the rise of modern
anti-semitism reminded them that no matter how they wished to
express their Jewishness, being Jewish is not a matter of choice but a
matter of birth and blood. Modernity, in short, created an ongoing
identity crisis for Jews who have been asking themselves three funda-
mental questions: Why should one remain Jewish? What is Judaism?
How should one be Jewish? There are as many answers to these ques-
tions as there are Jews, but several dominant approaches emerged dur-
ing the nineteenth century in Europe and then continued to evolve
during the twentieth century in America and Israel.
B. Jewish Responses to the Emancipation
The first type of response to the challenge of modernity was accultura-
tion and assimilation. In Western and Central Europe, Jews eagerly
welcomed the possibility of social and cultural integration and enthu-
siastically immersed themselves in the dominant culture, which they
regarded as superior to their own. As Heinrich Heine and many intel-
lectuals of his generation felt, being Jewish was an unfortunate acci-
dent of birth that had to be discarded if one was to enjoy the progress
of modern life. Conversion to Christianity was but an entry ticket to
full participation in society.15 But Heine and other Jewish intellectuals
would also quickly discover that shedding one’s Jewish identity was
psychologically very difficult, resulting in profound inner conflict and
bouts of self-hatred. While in theory the modern nation-state did not
require Jews to formally convert in order to gain citizenship, in reality
Jews were continually excluded from various occupations and posi-
tions which they could obtain only after formal conversion. For those
who actively sought to rid themselves of their Jewishness, it was just a
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matter of one or two generations before active assimilation meant the
loss of Jewish identity altogether.
Most Jews in Western and Central Europe, however, wished to inte-
grate into modern Western society without denying their Jewish ethnic
identity. The apparent secularization of Western culture during the
nineteenth century created the (false?) impression that Jews could
actively contribute to Western culture as members of the new modern
nation-state, without being reminded of their Jewishness. Gladly for-
saking traditional Jewish upbringing, which many found embarrass-
ingly backward, European Jews delved into secular activities in
literature, drama, art, music, journalism, the liberal professions, and
the natural sciences, all of which were now open to them. The unprece-
dented creativity of Jews in these secular pursuits would create the
impression that Jews were themselves the creators and main beneficia-
ries of modernity. This perception would greatly contribute to modern
anti-semitism and the claim that the Jews are responsible for the ills of
modernity, such as social disintegration, breakdown of families, loss of
traditional morals, and the like.
Looking at Judaism through the lens of modern European culture,
many Jews found their tradition to be inadequate and called for its
transformation from within. If Jews were to enter modern life, Judaism
had to be modernized. Those who sought the reform of Judaism from
within wished to remain Jewish, but they now looked at Judaism
strictly as a set of beliefs, rather than a comprehensive way of life of an
ethnic group.16 As an equal citizen, a Jew is German or a Frenchman of
the “Mosaic faith,” an individual who shares with all humans the prin-
ciples of universal rationalism, and differs from them only in regard to
the commitment to spread the universal essence of Judaism — ethical
monotheism—to humanity at large. The rational beliefs of Judaism are
not only compatible with membership in the modern nation-state, the
Jews’ commitment to an ancient tradition of justice make them espe-
cially good citizens who work for the progress of humanity.
If the essence of Judaism is a universal “ethical monotheism” that
addresses all humans, what about the particularistic features of the
Jewish tradition, such as the doctrine of Chosenness, the Hebrew lan-
guage, the endlessly minute legal practices, and the longing for the
coming of the Messiah and the return of Jews to the Land of Israel?
Furthermore, since Judaism had been a way of life, what about all the
peculiar rituals, practices, customs, and sensibilities that differentiated
Jews from their neighbors? Indeed, the advocates of Reform were will-
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ing to either discard or radically transform the particularistic features
of Judaism in order to facilitate integration into modern life. Tradi-
tional Judaism could not remain the same if Jews were to join the mod-
ern world.
The theoretical underpinning for the reform of Judaism came from
the philosophy of the Enlightenment, especially as formulated by
Immanuel Kant. Reform Jewish theologians accepted the primacy of
the individual as a rational, autonomous, self-legislating agent for
whom religion is a set of ethical, universalizable moral principles.
Therefore, from the perspective of the Reformers, heteronomous Jew-
ish law has no authority over the individual, unless the agent chooses
to make specific elements of the Jewish legal tradition binding upon
him/herself. The Halakhic tradition articulated by the rabbis was thus
declared non-binding, a product of human historical activity that over
the centuries had become entrenched, distorting the essence of
Judaism. That essence is to be found in the ethical teachings of biblical
prophets, but the Bible, too, was viewed as divinely inspired rather
than divinely revealed. The biblical text had to be subjected to rational
analysis by the tools of contemporary science and its message accepted
only to the extent that it expressed the “essence of Judaism.”
The Reform agenda of biblical criticism, redesigning the synagogue
service, and the assault on the authority of the legal tradition,
unleashed a major outcry by Jews who felt obliged to protect Judaism
from its destroyers. The opponents of change proudly adopted the
term “Orthodox,” originally used as a derisive term to denote those
who opposed the modernization of Judaism. Thus, Orthodoxy itself
came into being as a product of Jewish struggle with modernity, even
though Orthodoxy presented itself as the defender of a divinely
revealed, eternal, and authoritative legal tradition. To the Orthodox,
Judaism was not just a matter of faith but a comprehensive way of life
guided by the principles of Torah as interpreted by authoritative rab-
bis whose rulings are part of the Oral Law. Not surprisingly, when
Orthodox thinkers, such as Samson Raphael Hirsch, would attempt to
articulate a theory of eternal Judaism, they would employ contempo-
rary philosophical categories absorbed in European universities that
were now open to Jews.17
But if the early proponents of Orthodoxy, especially in Germany,
were university educated rabbis who believed that Judaism is compat-
ible with a certain measure of cultural integration, by the 1870s they
would find themselves criticized by other Orthodox leaders who
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would eventually be called Ultra-Orthodox. The internal division of
Orthodoxy took place in Hungary, which granted Jews full civil rights
in 1867.18 Hungarian Jews, including those who practiced traditional
Jewish life, did join the political process and sent delegates to the Hun-
garian parliament, indicating that initially Orthodoxy did not
denounce democracy and its values. It was an internal debate about
the nature of Jewish involvement in Hungarian politics that resulted in
factionalism within Orthodoxy and the rise of Ultra-Orthodoxy. The
latter would militantly reject accommodation with modernity, espe-
cially in terms of culture and education, willingly isolating themselves
from the style and sensibilities of the modern world. Ironically, Ultra-
Orthodox thinkers had themselves to construct a conception of
unchanging Jewish tradition in order to legitimize their isolationist
stance, while bringing about the politicization of Jewish religious life.
It is this version of Orthodoxy that survived the Holocaust (since exter-
mination of the Jews in Hungary only began in 1944) and has experi-
enced unprecedented growth in the United States and Israel in the last
few decades.
How much to change and how to legitimize change has been the
bone of contention among the various strands of modern Judaism.
Between the Reformers and the Orthodox camp were those who
acknowledged that Judaism was a product of historical processes of
change, but who thought that modernization of Judaism should con-
form to the principles of Jewish tradition. Jewish Law itself, they
noted, recognized the distinction between divinely revealed law (mi-
deoraita, literally, “from the Torah”) and human interpretation (mi-dera-
banan, literally, “from the rabbis”) and that change has been a
characteristic of Jewish life from the very beginning. According to this
so-called “Positive-Historical School,” Judaism evolved over time in
response to changing historical circumstances, but the tradition itself
created the parameters of change and placed the authority for change
on the Jewish people as a whole. As a product of history, Judaism
could be studied by the tools of the academic science of history, but
changes in Judaism had to be proposed in moderation, taking into con-
sideration the unique features and sensibilities of Jewish life. Thus,
prayer had to remain in Hebrew and not in the vernacular, allegiance
to the Land of Israel had to be declared even though Jews were now
part of modern society, and the belief in a personal messiah had to be
affirmed.
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In twentieth-century America, the views of the “Positive Historical
School” would be translated as a program for the Americanization of
the masses of traditional Jews who had emigrated from East European
countries (1880 – 1924), enabling them to remain loyal to their East
European Jewish folkways while becoming fully Americanized.19 This
has come to be called Conservative Judaism, to be distinguished from
Reform Judaism, which provided the program for the Americanization
of the first wave of Jewish immigrants from Germany and Central
Europe in the mid-nineteenth century. For traditional East European
Jews, American Reform Judaism was too foreign. They needed a dif-
ferent program to enable them to become Americanized without losing
their ties to traditional Judaism. That was supplied by Conservative
Judaism, although its leaders were originally members of Reform
Judaism and its financial support came from wealthy Jews who sided
with Reform.
During the twentieth century, especially after the Holocaust, the dif-
ferences between Conservative and Reform have narrowed consider-
ably. Reform Judaism became more traditional in practice and
affirmative of the national dimension of Jewish existence; and the rank
and file of the Conservative movement in the second and third genera-
tions were neither deeply knowledgeable regarding traditional Jewish
life nor informed about the way the leadership of the movement made
decisions about how to adapt to American life. Nonetheless, there are
many differences in worship style and theological emphasis. Reform
Judaism has been extremely open to non-Jews, no longer requires a
spouse of intermarriage to convert to Judaism, and recognizes the Jew-
ishness of a child even if only the father is Jewish. Reform congrega-
tions debate today the status of non-Jewish spouses and their role in
Jewish communal life and religious services. Conservative Judaism
continues to assert the centrality of Hebrew in synagogue worship and
the authority of Halakhic process, but changes within the movement,
most profoundly in regard to the status of women, indicate how flexi-
ble and open to change this movement is. These progressive forms of
modern Judaism still retain separate institutional structures, but they
join forces in struggles against Orthodoxy. The latter has experienced a
remarkable resurgence in the last two decades, as many Jews seeking
deeper spiritual meaning find their way to traditional Jewish sources.
The real struggle between liberal forms of Judaism and Orthodox
variants is now waged in the state of Israel, where non-Orthodox
forms of Judaism are not validated. Conversions by Reform and Con-
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servative rabbis are not considered valid, and there is considerable
hostility toward the Reform and Conservative presence in Israel. Some
Orthodox rabbis have gone as far as saying that Reform and Conserva-
tive Judaism are not even forms of Judaism, and secular Jews who
know little about religion or about the history of modern Judaism
accept these assertions. Both Reform and Conservative Judaism are
viewed as American imports that have little relevance in the complex
reality of Israel. In the modern state of Israel, intra-Jewish factionalism
has been exacerbated because Israel has no separation between reli-
gion and state. All views, religious or secular, are given political
expression and fight for survival in Israel’s robust democratic system.
To understand intra-Jewish diversity in the state of Israel we need to
briefly remember how the state came into being and what it signified
in Jewish consciousness.
The state of Israel was founded in 1948 after seven decades of Zion-
ist activity.20 Zionism emerged in Europe in the 1890s as a response to
modern anti-semitism, arguing that the Emancipation of the Jews had
failed: the West did not and could not absorb the Jews as equal citizens
because of the long-standing fear and hatred of Jews (“Judeophobia”)
that permeated Western consciousness. The only solution to the Jewish
problem was a mass migration of the Jews out of Europe and the cre-
ation of a “national home.” The Zionists had to prove that the Jews
were indeed a distinct nation (as against the Jewish assimilationists,
secularists, reformers, and socialists, all of whom denied Jewish
national existence). The Zionist claim was difficult to prove since the
Jewish nation lacked the marks of other nations: a land of its own,
political sovereignty, and a national culture. Indeed, to become a nor-
mal nation, the Jews had to acquire these features, but they had to do
so by relying primarily on themselves, emancipating themselves from
the debilitating habits of diaspora existence for two millennia. Nations
should lend political support to the movement, but it was the Jews
who should liberate themselves from the disabilities imposed on them
by other nations.
C. Zionist Variants
From its inception, Zionism was rooted in a paradox.21 On the one
hand, Zionism was a radical departure from traditional Judaism in
terms of analysis, goals, and modes of operation. The original vision-
ary of Zionism, Theodor Herzl (1860 – 1904), was a highly assimilated
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Jew from Budapest, a successful journalist and playwright in Vienna
who was forced to come to terms with modern anti-semitism during
the Dreyfus trial in Paris in 1894. His analysis of the Jewish predica-
ment was thoroughly secular, inspired by European nationalist move-
ments, especially Italian nationalism. Without making any appeal to
the sources of Judaism, Herzl envisioned the creation of a Jewish state
that would actualize the best ideals of European society (a peculiar
mixture of European liberal democracy, humanism, and socialism).
The new, just society would restore dignity to the Jews and be a model
for humanity.22 Herzl himself was willing to compromise about the
location of the new national home, and his readiness to entertain the
British proposal of Uganda led to serious opposition. Herzl’s oppo-
nents were East European Jews who understood that Zionism could
not succeed unless it captured the yearnings and ideals of the Jewish
tradition. The only homeland of the Jew must be the Land of Israel, at
this point an underdeveloped region of the Ottoman Empire.
For the critics of Herzl, Zionism was not only a revolution against
exilic conditions but also a continuity with the Jewish religious past,
albeit through major modifications. Zionism would have to liberate the
Jews not only from the oppression of diaspora existence but from the
very limiting religious beliefs of the Jewish Halakhic tradition, without
disengaging them from their literary sources. The vehicle of the cre-
ation of a Zionist culture would be the Hebrew language itself, which
would now be used not only for prayer but for daily conversation and
literary expression about all aspects of the human condition. Hebrew
language and literature would supplant all Jewish diaspora dialects,
especially Yiddish, the language which prevented the modernization
of the Jews in Europe. The revival of Hebrew would enable Zionists to
reconnect with the remote past of the Jewish people — ancient biblical
Israel — whose historical reality was the very justification of Zionist
return to the Land of Israel. From the new center of Jewish life, a mod-
ern, national Hebrew culture would radiate, serving as a focal point for
the transformation of Jewish life in the diaspora, which would con-
tinue to exist. Through a slow, dedicated cultural transformation of
diaspora mentality, a new Jewish person would emerge: a secular,
fearless, free, self-reliant, and modern Jew who could relate to non-
Jews as a true equal.23
The most radical Zionist transformation was to concern the very
attitude toward physical nature. The return to the Land of Israel was to
effect a major economic transformation of Jewish life: Jews would no
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longer find their livelihood from finance and commerce but become
farmers who work the land with their own hands. Farming would
reverse the alienation of Jews from nature, imposed on Jews by non-
Jewish society and contributing to Jewish weakness. The new Jew, as
Max Nordau put it, will be a “muscular Jew:” strong in body and fierce
in spirit, who will conquer his or her own weakness and thereby con-
quer the very arid and inhospitable land.24 The Zionist program was to
be achieved not through military conquest but through self-conquest
and conquest of the land through tilling. The Jew had to conquer his or
her own weakness by reuniting with the land and deriving new
strength from nature, the very nature that rabbinic Judaism relegated
to the margin in centuries of divine worship.
But how could this be accomplished by young, inexperienced, Jew-
ish idealists who had no experience in farming? The answer was by
joining individuals into communes, organized as semi-military units to
conquer the Land and to create a new Jewish person. The communal
lifestyle created by Zionism was a matter of necessity, but within a
short time its ideological justification was provided by Jewish social-
ists who were disillusioned with socialist universalism and the Russ-
ian Revolution. In the late nineteenth century, Jews were very attracted
to European socialist movements because of the emphasis on universal
brotherhood and universal solutions to the problems of humanity.25
Though many Jewish socialists had a hard time giving up their mid-
dle-class lifestyle, they passionately called for the debunking of capi-
talist economic structures as a way to remove all forms of injustice,
once and for all. In the new socialist order that transforms humanity
itself, the Jewish problem would simply disappear.
But, by the first decade of the twentieth century, it became clear that
socialism was a dubious solution: first, European socialism was not
devoid of anti-semitism and, second, socialist analysis of economic
development was not borne out by Jewish history. The Jews are not a
class, but a people divided by conflicting economic interests. The solu-
tion to the Jewish predicament in modernity would come only when
Jewish nationalism, i.e., Zionism, conducts itself according to socialist
principles as adapted to the particular conditions of the Jewish people.
A socialist version of Zionism would function as the ideological super-
structure for the communal lifestyle of the new pioneers in Palestine,
who firmly believed that, at last, the universal values of justice and
equality could become a reality for Jews.26
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What the early Zionist pioneers thought was just, however, con-
flicted with the views of the indigenous Arab population in Palestine.
The Arabs were quick to understand that a mass migration of Euro-
pean Jews to Palestine would change the nature of the place. Ironically,
it was Zionist settlement that rekindled the nationalist sentiments of
the local Palestinian population, leading to bloody conflicts about the
control of the land. From the Arab perspective, Zionist settlement was
anything but just; it was, rather, a usurpation of rights through cun-
ning and deception, which had to be prevented. Palestinian national-
ism emerged as Arab nations in the Middle East were overthrowing
the last vestiges of European imperialism, even though the new Arab
nations themselves had come into being as creations of imperial
power.27 And it was the manipulation by the global superpowers, Eng-
land and France, of conflicting national movements that would leave
the Middle East embroiled in interminable struggle. In the Arab, pre-
dominantly Muslim, Middle East, the new Jewish presence was once
again the rejected Other. Treatment of the Jewish minority in Arab
states deteriorated significantly from the benign tolerance in the pre-
modern period.28
In the tense relations between Zionist settlers and local Arab popu-
lations the new communes, known as kibbutzim, served essential
defensive roles. Though Palestine after 1922 was under the British
Mandate, the safety of individuals and property was periodically jeop-
ardized by a hostile Arab population who understood the nature of the
struggle perhaps better than the Zionist settlers. The kibbutzim were
the foundation for the emergence of new Jewish military prowess, first
for the sake of self-defense against Arabs and later directed against the
British Mandate itself with the final push toward the creation of a new
Jewish state. And the new communes were also the foundation of a
new Hebrew culture. How Jewish was the new culture? This is a very
difficult question to answer. On the surface, the kibbutz culture was
thoroughly secular. Belief in God was neither asserted nor expected,
and the traditional Jewish religious lifestyle was practically aban-
doned, a relic of the bourgeois, diasporic past that had to be over-
thrown by the Zionist revolution. Yet a closer look indicates a greater
degree of continuity with the Jewish tradition. In the kibbutzim, the
Bible was studied as national literature; the Sabbath and the holidays
were celebrated with new creative rituals; and a strong nationalist
identity was forged through the study of Jewish history in which anti-
semitism was emphasized.
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The Hebrew culture of the kibbutzim defined what Israeli culture
would be after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. When the
state was declared, however, it defined itself not as a “state for Jews”
(as Herzl envisioned it) but rather as a “Jewish State,” where Jews from
all over the world have an automatic right to become citizens by virtue
of being Jewish. The precise meaning of “Jewish State,” however, was
rather unclear, leaving Jews in Israel and the world over to debate it
endlessly. The state of Israel came into being with the support of world
nations three years after the demise of one third of the Jewish people in
the Holocaust. Though the Holocaust alone was not the cause of the
creation of the state, it clearly was an important contributing factor.
D. The State of Israel: A House Divided
The suffering of the Jews in the Holocaust finally brought the nations
of the world to support the Zionist agenda, but the creation of the state
of Israel meant little peace, either externally or internally. The Jews in
Israel have remained the perennial Other, fighting for the right of the
state to exist among nations that wish to see its demise. And within the
state of Israel it is the Arab Palestinian population who functions as the
“Other Within.” Though enjoying citizenship, the Arabs have not
enjoyed the same rights and have suffered from the intentionally dis-
criminatory policies of successive Israeli governments to keep the Arab
sector less developed than the Jewish majority. After 1967, Palestinian
nationalism, which attempted to address the plight of the 1948
refugees, gained momentum among Israeli Arabs, further complicat-
ing the interdependence between the Jewish state and its Arab neigh-
bors.
From within, a heated debate about the Jewish character of the new
state has been raging. If Israel is a Jewish State (and not only a secular
state where Jews are the majority), then should Israeli culture and soci-
ety be conducted according to the principles of Jewish religious law?
Since many of the early Zionists were avid secularists, a return to a
religiously governed state seemed to be the worst application of dias-
pora mentality.29 But it was the religious Jews who rejected any
attempt to create a constitution for the nascent state on the ground that
the Torah is the only constitution of the Jewish people. In the first three
decades of the Jewish state (1948 – 1977), the political culture was the
legacy of socialist Zionism, now translated into the ideal of “statism,”
the subjugation of all agendas to the needs of the new state. This ideol-
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ogy served Israel well in the very difficult early years, when it had to
absorb millions of Jews, including Holocaust survivors and Jews who
were forced to leave newly established Arab nations. The Jewish immi-
grants from Muslim countries did not undergo the Emancipation or
modernization; they remained tied to the Jewish religious tradition
that they could practice in relative peace as second-class citizens.
The absorption of massive Jewish immigration from Muslim coun-
tries into a new nation of immigrants from Europe was ridden with
difficulties, and left scars, which are felt to this day. Resenting their
inferior social status, Jews from Muslim countries have harbored
resentment toward the institutions, culture, and style of Israeli society.
The newcomers would change the political map of Israel in 1977, top-
pling a Labor government and electing a rival party whose policies
were privatization and the dismantling of the welfare state. Since 1977,
Jews from Muslim nations have become ever stronger in Israeli politics
and culture, changing the flavor and orientation of Israeli life.
At the close of the twentieth century, the state of Israel is by no
means closer to internal peace. On the contrary, the rival visions about
the Jewishness of the state have become more antagonistic and at times
it seems that Israel is on the brink of civil war. These debates are all
carried out in the political arena as over twenty parties vie for power
and the Jewish religion has become thoroughly politicized. Religious
parties, even Ultra-Orthodox that find the state of Israel to be a nega-
tion of Judaism’s ideals, employ politics in order to gain financial sup-
port from the state for their favorite institution. The politicization of
religion further contributes to the alienation and hostility between sec-
ularists and traditionalists, tensions between Israel and the liberal Jews
of the diaspora, and frustration among Israelis who begin to doubt the
ability of Jews to govern themselves.
III. Judaism and Religious Pluralism
The first two sections provide a lot of historical data to illustrate my
position that we cannot talk about “religion” in abstract general terms.
It is only when we understand a religious tradition on its own terms
that we can begin to develop a perspective about the role of religion in
contemporary life. So what can the story of Judaism tell us about the
problem of global homogenization of culture? In the last section of this
essay, I reflect on the historical data from a theological perspective. As
a Jewish theologian, I regard all the sacred sources of Judaism (includ-
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ing biblical, rabbinic, philosophic, and mystical) as the wellspring from
which I draw the wisdom that enables me to make sense of life and
respond to contemporary challenges, including the challenge of glob-
alization. Speaking on the basis of the sources of Judaism, I offer some
reflections about the challenge of globalization not as definite, closely
argued conclusions but as tentative suggestions for further reflection.
A. Pluralism is a Human Good
The historical experience of the Jewish people teaches the need to pro-
tect the uniqueness of groups and individuals against the demands for
homogenization. In their principled refusal to be anything other than
who they are, Jews over the centuries have, in effect, been saying
“respect our difference; allow us to be who we are; don’t assimilate us
into your own self-understanding; don’t impose your values, beliefs,
sensibilities, and rituals on us, because we are not you.” In their persis-
tent presence and their intense internal debates, Jews stand as a testi-
mony to the value of pluralism both vis-à-vis other traditions and from
within Judaism itself. I, therefore, maintain that pluralism is itself
good: a society that allows for religious diversity is better than a soci-
ety in which only one outlook or one perspective is allowed to flourish.
This message is particularly relevant today in a world that is becoming
increasingly homogeneous, where cultural differences have been
blurred and local cultures and religious traditions are under the threat
of extinction. The history of the Jews suggests to us that whenever only
one form of human self-expression (be it religious or secular) is permit-
ted to flourish, injustice necessarily ensues, because other forms have
to be oppressed, marginalized, or obliterated. The very persistence of
the Jewish people stands as a challenge against uniformity and con-
formism.
The same is true for Judaism itself. Modern Jews must remember
that traditional Judaism was never monolithic, even though until the
modern period Jews have accepted the rabbinic version as normative.
Jews have disagreed about the meaning of Judaism even in the pre-
modern period: in the tenth century Karaites challenged the authority
of the rabbis and in the thirteenth century the philosophers debated
the true meaning of Jewish monotheism. Practices no less than beliefs
were hotly debated, especially when Jews from different regions were
forced to live with each other due to expulsions and migrations. Inter-
nal Jewish diversity has been intensified in the modern period because
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no communal body has any authority over Jews. Therefore, any
attempt to make one version of Judaism the one and only “authentic”
version is historically, theologically, and politically dubious. Histori-
cally, it denies the actual plurality of views in Judaism; theologically, it
is, at least in my view, a misreading of Jewish monotheism; and politi-
cally, it leads to religious coercion in which Jews commit injustice
against each other. Religious coercion conflicts not only with the
democratic principle of freedom to think and believe, but also with
some of the deepest religious teachings of Judaism which counsel
peace, tolerance, respect, and love of the Other. To impose but one
interpretation of Judaism to the exclusion of all others is a grave error.
B. Religious Justifications for Pluralism
My support for religious pluralism and opposition to religious coer-
cion (between Jews and non-Jews or among Jews) may seem to be con-
trary to the claims of monotheism. Since monotheism, after all, asserts
the existence of one God, does not Jewish monotheism itself legitimize
the struggle against “contending gods”? Not in my humble opinion.
Jewish monotheism, as I understand it, is compatible with pluralism
because it asserts that true oneness belongs only to God and not to
humans, not even to humans who speak in the name of God or any
absolute truth. Oneness and truth belong to God because God is the
Creator of all things and all things ultimately owe their existence to
God. Since the created order, by definition, is governed by multiplicity
and not unity, any attempt by creatures to impose the uniformity of a
singular vision in the created world is to improperly pretend to be
God, to know God’s mind, and to speak God’s truth as God knows it.
That, I believe, is the mark of human hubris that underlies so many of
the ethnic, political, and religious conflicts in human society. Such
hubris is based on the erroneous notion that humans can, in principle,
possess the entire truth. But the divine truth is infinite; it can never be
exhausted by one human version of it. The divine truth is always
larger, deeper, more complex, and more subtle than any one human
perspective can express. When humans try to “play God,” they neces-
sarily give what is finite, partial, and incomplete the status of the infi-
nite, the full, and the complete. Put differently, if we allow just one,
partial version of the infinite truth to dominate all others, we necessar-
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ily propagate error and commit injustice by oppressing, marginalizing,
or obliterating other visions of reality.
Any form of ideational coercion (religious or secular) also ignores
another deep insight of Jewish monotheism: the belief that all humans
are created in the divine image. Despite the radical differences
between the created and the Creator, Jewish monotheism asserts that
humans are, in some respect, like God. Regardless how we interpret
the meaning of the “divine image” (e.g., as the human soul, the human
intellect alone, or some intrinsic human worth), the belief that all
humans are created by God in the image of God makes any attempt to
diminish the humanity of another person or another group a sin
against God. The dehumanization of others, through coercion, oppres-
sion, exploitation, abuse, torture, or marginalization are all offenses
against the divine aspect of human nature. Humans commit such
offenses precisely because humans are not God. The history of the
human race has thus been replete with war, conflicts, suffering, tor-
ture, and injustice, because we have all failed to live up to the divine
aspect in us, even though we may speak in the name of absolute truth,
sacred texts, and religious authorities. It is only when we remember
that all human beings are created in the image of God that we can
begin to honor differences and respect the otherness of those who are
unlike us.
Much religious intolerance over the centuries has been committed
in the name of the divinely revealed status of certain truth claims. Pre-
sumably, a given religious tradition, or an interpretation thereof, has
absolute status because it is revealed by God. But I maintain that a plu-
ralistic reading of Jewish monotheism is compatible with the belief in
divine revelation because, as Abraham Joshua Heschel put it, “Judaism
is based upon a minimum of revelation and a maximum of interpreta-
tion, upon the will of God and upon the understanding of Israel.”30 Fol-
lowing Martin Buber’s understanding of divine revelation as a human
response to the presence of God, I, too, insist that divine revelation can
be accessed only through interpretation. But the latter, alas, is a human
activity subject to ambiguity and opaqueness, necessarily resulting in
diversity. The rabbis themselves were aware of this principle when
they distinguished between that which comes from God and that
which is legislated by humans. The responses to God’s presence are
always partial, incomplete, and fallible. Judaism could evolve over the
centuries through the activity of interpretation, which gave rise to
diverse views of the infinite truth. Any attempt to arrest the process by
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claiming that one reading of Judaism is the exclusive, authentic ver-
sion is, in fact, to undermine one of the main sources of Jewish survival
and vitality. Judaism will continue to grow and respond to future chal-
lenges only if interpretation is kept alive, resulting, in turn, in plural-
ism of opinions and practices.
I have argued so far that plurality of views, perspectives, and prac-
tices is itself a mark of the created order. In the created order, things
are what they are because they are limited by boundaries that mark
identity: to be something, a thing must be distinguished from that
which it is not. Affirmation of self, then, necessarily involves the asser-
tion of otherness. There is ample psychological research, especially by
the so-called “object-relation” psychologists, to support this claim. In
Judaism, the necessity of boundaries is conveyed in the biblical narra-
tive of creation. In Genesis, the world came into being as an act of sep-
aration of elements from each other: the heavens are separated from
the earth, the water from dry land, vegetation from animal life, and
humans from animals. Creation, then, is depicted not as an act of
bringing existence from non-existence but as an act of setting limits, of
delineating boundaries and asserting differences. The religious doc-
trine of creation sanctions difference.
The doctrine of creation (not to be confused with creationism) is at
the basis of the Jewish view of reality.31 From the separation between
the Creator and the created, the divine and the human, or God and
nature, through the separation between the holy and the profane, the
permitted and the forbidden, to the separation between Israel and the
nations, Judaism explicitly affirms the necessity of boundaries and the
establishment of differences. The numerous commandments in regard
to time, place, social relations, the body, and religious rituals all illus-
trate the centrality of boundaries in Jewish self-understanding. Con-
comitantly, sinful conduct is viewed in terms of crossing or blurring
boundaries established by divine revelation (which accords with the
principles that informed God’s initial act of creation). Setting things
apart and treating them according to their proper status is at the core
of Jewish religious conduct.
Yet boundaries, as we have seen in the historical survey of the Jew-
ish past, do not exclude interaction. Let me explore this idea on theo-
logical grounds. In a creation-based belief system, what could be more
other than God? Jewish monotheism asserts that the Creator God is the
Wholly Other, Who is unlike anything else. In the Middle Ages, Jewish
philosophers further explained how the oneness of God is different
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from the unity of discrete things and how God is both unique and
unknowable. Notwithstanding the radical difference between God and
the created world, the God of Judaism is not only transcendent but also
imminent in the world that He created. God is present in some way
both in the natural world and in human history, so that a relationship
with the Creator God is possible. Moreover, the belief that God
revealed His Will in the form of the Torah is the way in which Judaism
makes it clear that humans can interact with God. In other words, even
radical difference, such as the difference between God and created
humans, does not exclude relationship. In fact, in the mystical strand
of Judaism, the Kabbalah, God’s otherness demands interaction with
non-divine reality, especially human beings. According to the Kab-
balah, imperfection and disharmony are not only the mark of the cre-
ated order, they are also a feature of divine reality. And it is only the
joint effort of God and humans that can redeem reality (individual,
social, cosmic, and divine) from its inherent imperfection. But one
need not go to Kabbalah to find the Jewish insistence on the interde-
pendence of God and humanity; it is a basic feature of the Jewish
understanding of religious worship.
Yet all versions of Jewish theology insist that redemption belongs to
the remote future of the Messianic Age and not to the present. The
ideal cannot be realized in time-space; it can only be approximated.32
Jewish worship in all its diverse forms is thus an ongoing effort to
attain closeness to God while recognizing that, until the Messianic
Age, such closeness is at best momentary and temporary. Even a mys-
tical experience, which some outstanding personalities clearly aspired
to attain, cannot overcome the limitations of the created order. Until
the Messianic Age, Jews live in an unredeemed, though not unre-
deemable, world. Jewish action in the created, spatio-temporal order is
geared to make the world a better place to live because it is more suit-
able for the presence of God. Jewish action in the moral-social sphere,
such as feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and caring for the sick,
cannot in and of itself, redeem the world, because human action is, by
definition, partial, limited, and incomplete. This is why the Jews could
not and cannot accept the claims of Christianity and why all messianic
contenders in Jewish history have been proven to be false messiahs.
That human reality is not yet redeemed is also suggested by the failure
of modern Zionism and secular ideologies, such as socialism, to deliver
the Jews and/or humanity from the condition of imperfection. All
utopian agendas, which assert success in the here and now, are going
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to be proven a failure in the created order. From a Jewish perspective,
they constitute a form of idolatry. If so, then the divine must remain an
ideal that inspires humans to be better, not an ideal already actualized
in time-space.
C. Religion and Political Power
Plurality of religious views, perspectives, and practices is thus the
mark of an unredeemed world, a world that is governed by finitude,
uncertainty, and ambiguity rather than by triumphalist uniformity. In
practice, pluralism means that individuals, social groups, and nations
must all learn to limit their appetite for power and curb their desire for
domination or expansion. Asking humans to exercise self-control so
that others can exist is clearly in the interest of the powerless. Indeed, I
advocate limits on power precisely because I am familiar with the
political powerlessness of the Jews for two millennia. But what about
those who already possess power? Could they willingly give it up in
order to accommodate pluralism?
The Jewish experience in history can be used as a basis for reflec-
tions on the meaning of political power. Like all things in the created
order, political power is at best temporary, if not entirely illusory.
Empires, states, governments, bureaucracies, and social institutions all
come and go, subject to the process of change; none remains powerful
forever. The lesson of history, especially Jewish history, is that more
often than not it is in the interest of the temporarily powerful to allow
the Other not only to exist but to thrive. On the basis of Jewish history,
one can make a strong argument that a political structure in which dif-
ferences are allowed to be expressed rather than squashed will last
longer than one in which uniformity is enforced. But to allow diverse
groups to exist requires that members of a polity create laws and polit-
ical structures that curb the power of the state or ruler. Limited power,
as is advocated by the democratic vision, cannot be established merely
through self-restraint on the part of the powerful; it requires laws to
enforce and protect the interests of the powerless.
The history of the Jews captures the problematical relationship
between pluralism and political power. On the one hand, Jewish cul-
ture could thrive without political power, especially when Jews lived
in multi-ethnic and multi-religious polities. But on the other hand,
Jewish political powerlessness also had a high price attached to it: not
only could defenseless Jews be easy prey to their enemies, Jews could
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easily lose their self-esteem and pride and incorporate the negative
perception of the others into their own self-understanding. Jewish per-
sistent self-hatred is one of the heavy costs that Jews paid for their
powerlessness. Regaining political power was, therefore, a necessity
for Jews in the modern period.
In the state of Israel, as we have seen, the Jews had to come to terms
with the presence of a large Arab minority, itself religiously diverse, as
well as with the burning nationalist self-definition of the Arab popula-
tion. The victims of the past now possess political power, which can be
used either justly or unjustly. Being a victim in the past does not pre-
clude being a victimizer in the present. The occupation of the territo-
ries that Israel conquered in 1967 in a war imposed on it by Arab
neighbors has been posing the most difficult challenge to Jews. Abuses
of power, which only galvanized Palestinian nationalism, have seri-
ously damaged the moral integrity of Israelis. This lesson is now
understood by larger segments of Israeli society, and it is very possible
that, under the current government, the road will be paved for separat-
ing the two nations so that Israel will not oppress the Palestinians and
they, in turn, will not attempt to undermine Israel’s existence. How to
achieve this political separation is indeed very complicated, but I
believe that, in principle, it is the setting of clear boundaries that could
bring about the end to abuse.
The other challenge to the modern state of Israel pertains to the
nature of democracy. In the pre-modern world, religious pluralism
could sometimes be maintained within a hierarchical structure. Each
religious minority could conduct itself by its own laws with the per-
sonal status of individuals derived from membership in a well-defined
religious group. While hierarchies are compatible with religious plu-
ralism, it is important to remember that the minority is always viewed
as inferior (both in theory and in practice) and that it is precisely that
inferiority which modern democratic principles have challenged.
Though democracy may be more just in theory, democracy (at least in
the particular version of the European Enlightenment) also under-
mines the self-definition of the group. This has been the lesson of the
Emancipation of the Jews, who were expected to disintegrate as a
group once they received citizenship in a modern democracy. How
religious groups can continue to retain their differences in a democra-
tic structure is the challenge for the twenty-first century. The American
solution to the problem was the separation of state and religion, but
that model itself emerged out of a Christian understanding of religion
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which does not cohere with the corporate structure of other religions
such as Judaism. Still, Jews in fact have managed to flourish in the
modern world, especially in America, in part resisting total assimila-
tion because of the existence of the state of Israel. In the state of Israel,
the tension between democratic pluralism and traditional Judaism is
now felt most acutely, both in the interaction between the various fac-
tions in Israel and in regard to the Arab minority. Israel is now a house
divided and only time will tell whether it will articulate a pluralistic
vision which allows for diverse readings of Judaism to coexist along
with Christian and Islamic minorities. Let me explore now how this
challenge could be addressed on the basis of the religious teachings of
Judaism.
D. The Limits of Pluralism
If pluralism expresses a deep-seated truth about the human condition,
does that imply that pluralism is an absolute value? I don’t think so.
Pluralism is an instrumental good, but not an absolute good. Although
a world that allows for more visions, ways of life, and habits of the
heart is better than a world in which this is not allowed, it does not
mean that pluralism should be unlimited. Pluralism is limited by
morality and by truth. Views or practices which expressly call for the
elimination of the Other (as Nazism called for the extermination of the
Jews) or for the subjugation of the Other (as racist ideologies in the
United States and in apartheid South Africa have advocated) are both
morally wrong and untrue. They are morally wrong because they com-
promise (to say the least) the humanity of those who are declared infe-
rior, and what they claim about the Other to legitimize discrimination
and oppression is factually untrue (i.e., Jews are not a sub-human
species; blacks are not naturally inferior to whites).
To declare a given viewpoint untrue implies that the truth-value of
various claims, including those uttered in the name of God, can be
taken to task by rational humans. Pluralism does not mean that
humans have to give up their ability to pass judgment on various truth
claims. This is not to glorify human rationality nor is it to equate
humanity with the ability to think. Rather, it is to say that humans
have a responsibility to employ their thinking capacity and not to
accept certain teachings as true when they are patently false. The oblig-
ation to exercise rationality is acute in our generation due to the prolif-
eration of sophisticated advertisements that easily manipulate human
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limitations. As the Nazis understood so well, manipulating public
opinion and creating false myths have become much easier with the
technological advances of the twentieth century. The horrendous his-
tory of racism, of which the Jews have been major, though not the only,
victims, places on humans the obligation to differentiate between truth
and false claims so as to protect intrinsic human dignity and worth.
Pluralism, then, need not result in epistemic relativism. As faulty and
limited as it is, human reasoning can make reasonable separation
between what is true and what is false in a large segment of human
experience. The reliance on reason has been the major strategy of self-
defense Jews have employed in their polemics against non-Jews; it
should now be employed in internal Jewish polemics.
E. Judaism and the Challenges of Globalization
Where does this all leave us as far as globalization is concerned? With
the technological advances of the twentieth century and the break-
down of national boundaries, our world has become smaller and
smaller, forcing groups, ideologies, and traditions to come to terms
with each other. The shrinking of the world and the proliferation of
sophisticated technology make us all more vulnerable to conflicts that
could easily destroy not only the feuding parties but also large seg-
ments of world population — as well as the physical environment that
makes life on this planet feasible. Globalization would be a positive
process that leads to world peace only if it allows for diversity, only if
it allows for pluralism of opinions, styles, cultures, ideologies, and
practices. Preserving differences can be compatible with listening to
one another, honoring differences, and allowing the Other to flourish,
if we so wish. But to do so, religions, nations, ideologies, and individ-
uals will all have to exercise the virtue of self-restraint. They will have
to curb the scope of their claims without giving up their own identity.
Humbly coming to terms with the limits of human created existence
and avoiding the temptation of arrogance, we must allow for those
who are different from us not only to exist next to us but also to thrive.
In the created, finite, incomplete, and unredeemed world, we have no
choice but to follow the words of Leviticus 19: 26: “ve-ahavta le-reakha
kamokha (love your neighbor as you love yourself).” But to love the
Other and make the Other our brother, we must first know who we are.
For me, as a Jew, a historian of Judaism, and a Jewish theologian, this
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knowledge comes from the affirmation of the link to the past, espe-
cially the past of the Jewish people.
It is as a Jew that I speak against the dangers that face a world gov-
erned by transnational corporations whose major concern is the maxi-
mization of profit. The transnational world will be, most likely, less
prone to global wars (since they jeopardize the interests of the transna-
tional corporation) but it is also a world in which human diversity is
seriously threatened as local customs, traditions, and sensibilities are
obliterated in the name of corporate materialism. In this environment,
being human is equated with possession of material goods from which
one can derive comfort and pleasure. This is a dangerously simplistic
understanding of “human” against which Judaism, as well as other
religious traditions, speak most forcefully. Judaism reminds us that
while bodily pleasures are good in themselves, they must not be made
into the ultimate end of human life. Our full humanity can be
expressed not when we exclusively pursue material pleasures but
when we devote ourselves to the worship of God within which bodily
joy has a legitimate place. As Judaism has spoken truth to earthly pow-
ers in the past, it must now speak truth to transnational corporations,
resisting their campaign to impose on the global village a shallow form
of commodity-centered “happiness.” Judaism can and must remind us
all that human well-being involves much more than material comfort
and that neither profit nor efficiency are ultimate human values.
Judaism and other religious traditions, each in their own unique way,
remind us where we come from and what human life is really about.
Let us remember these lessons as we move to face the challenges of the
“global moment.” 
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